



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


# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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

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
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## South Vietnam



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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### DAILY BRIEF

South Vietnam: [Administrative paralysis is spreading from Saigon to outlying areas.]

[The US Embassy reports that the decline of governmental authority in the provinces is most severe in coastal central Vietnam. In cities such as Hué, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Nha Trang, the reluctance of the police to control civil disturbances has allowed vigilante elements to take the law into their own hands.]

[Dr. Le Khac Quyen's People's Revolutionary Committee (PRC) has established local People's National Salvation Councils in most of the coastal cities, where these councils often serve as de facto local governments.]

[The burgeoning influence of Quyen's movement is reflected in the fact that he and a deputy have been named to the new 17-man High National Council in Saigon. There are also reports that the PRC may establish a chapter in the capital.]

[The aims of the PRC are not clear. It has been closely identified with a militant central Vietnamese Buddhist faction. It has also been in the forefront of the agitation for return to civilian rule and the elimination of Diemist vestiges in the government and the military.]

[There is no hard evidence yet of Communist influence in the movement, but the local councils seem highly vulnerable to Viet Cong penetration and exploitation. In any event, by assuming government powers

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the councils help accomplish the Communist objective of undermining central government control and sapping the morale of civil servants]

[In the central government itself, lack of firm direction has led to serious demoralization. Many ministries now handle only the most routine business. The ministers, as well as second-level bureaucrats, freely express their pessimism to US officials]

[Even though US and Vietnamese officials are again meeting on pacification planning, these meetings do not seem to lead to action by the Vietnamese]

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DAILY BRIEF

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Cyprus: A disagreement between President Makarios and General Grivas over foreign aid could lead to an open break.

Grivas has recently complained publicly that Greece has not received proper credit for the material support it has furnished the Greek Cypriots. On 27 September, Grivas made a speech in which he scoffed at expectations of aid coming from other countries. Pro-Grivas newspapers have also questioned the advisability of seeking assistance from Egypt or the USSR.

Makarios, the Cypriot Communists, and most of the Greek Cypriot press meanwhile continue to emphasize the importance of securing aid from Cairo and Moscow. Several Nicosia dailies claim that an aid agreement with the USSR will be signed shortly.

Although Makarios and Grivas thus seem likely to clash over the foreign aid issue, their basic disagreement still seems to be over the political future of the island. Grivas remains an uncompromising advocate of union with Greece. Most observers believe that Makarios wants an independent Cyprus under his domination and that he gives only lip service to the union idea.

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DAILY BRIEF

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United Nations: [A resolution to give Nationalist China's seat in the UN to Communist China would probably come close to receiving a simple majority in this year's General Assembly]

[The Japanese ambassador to the UN has told the US Mission his information indicates that such a resolution would at best fall short of a majority by six or seven votes, and at worst might even get one vote more than a majority. The US Mission agrees that the vote would fall somewhere between those limits]

[The Chinese representation issue has been ruled an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority for approval. This ruling is not likely to be changed, but a substantial increase in votes for Peiping would be a serious setback for Taipei. Last year a resolution to seat Peiping received 41 votes in favor, 57 against with 12 abstentions]

[Chiang Kai-shek's continuing concern over internal morale on Taiwan, intensified by French recognition of Peiping in January, has strengthened his determination to adhere rigidly to the principle that his is the only government of China. He might leave the United Nations precipitately if a majority of the UN members support Communist China on the representation issue]

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DAILY BRIEF

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NOTES

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Honduras: Approximately 300 Communist-led armed guerrillas are believed by the Honduran Government to be preparing to attack the towns of Morazan and El Progreso in northwestern Yoro Province on 3 October. According to a Honduran official, 245 Honduran troops have been sent to the area to intercept the rebels. The troops are armed with automatic weapons, mortars, and recoilless rifles, but lack communications equipment.

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DAILY BRIEF

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The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

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The Treasury Department

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The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

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Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

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